Enforcement of policy is typically delegated. What sort of mission should the head of an enforcement program be given? When there is more than one firm being regulated their compliance decisions -otherwise completely separate -become linked in a way that depends on that mission. Under some sorts of missions firms compete to avoid the attention of the enforcer by competitive reductions in the extent of their non-compliance. Under others the interaction pushes in the opposite direction. We develop a general model or enforcement spillovers that allows for the ordering of some typical classes of missions. We find that in plausible settings 'target-driven' missions (that set a hard emissions target and flexible budget) achieve the same outcome at lower cost than 'budget-driven' ones (that fix budget). Inspection of some fixed fraction of firms is never optimal.
Introduction
The cop can only pull over one car at a time. To avoid a ticket you don't have to obey the speed limit -you just have to be going slower than the guy in the next lane. (Anon, Lifehacker.com (2007) ).
The enforcement of government policy is typically delegated. At an aggregate level, for example, enforcement of environmental legislation is delegated to an environment agency.
1 At the intra-agency level the enforcement of a particular area of legislation (say noise control) will generally have associated with it a dedicated enforcement program.
We ask the following question: When establishing such an enforcement program what mission should be given to the program leader? 2 A variety of missions are in common use and our model will be flexible enough to embody any of them. For the purposes of discussion, however, we will focus attention on two types. The first type requires that the enforcer achieve a particular rate of compliance at least cost. We will refer to such missions as target-driven.
The second type (which we will refer to as budget-driven) requires him achieving the highest possible compliance level subject to a budgen constraint.
It is natural to suppose that the target-driven and budget-driven approaches are dual to one another and therefore that the choice between them does not matter.
3 1 More generally crime control is delegated to a police force, tax collection to a revenue service and so on. We will refer to the 'enforcer' as if an individual (and male). 2 A lot of attention has been paid to the problems that arise when the interests of the principal and the delegate (as agent) are imperfectly aligned. Gailmard (2002) , Hopenhayn and Lohmann (1996) are two examples amongst many. These are applications of well-understood principalagency problems and we ignore them here. We assume, in other words, that incentives can be put in place to ensure that the enforcer pursue his mission diligently. In this sense our model fits into the delegation as strategic commitment literature strand of the literature (Spulber and Besanko (1992) ). 3 By dual we mean that if under a budget-driven mission involving a budget Y leads to a realized emissions rate X, then specifying X as the target under a target-driven mission would lead to realized enforcement costs Y. This may explain why scholars setting up economic models of enforcement have paid relatively little attention to the objective assigned to the enforcer.
We show that in any setting involving more than one firm such a supposition is wrong. Mission matters.
The essence of the story we are going to tell is as follows: firms facing a common enforcer find themselevs in a game not just with the enforcer, but with each others. That nature of that interaction depends critially upon what the enforcer is trying to achieve (his mission). This paper analyses the impact of that strategic interaction on the outcomes and provides a basis for ranking alternative missions.
An important conclusion is that their should be 'horses for courses' -the best mission to assign in a given enforcement setting will depend in predictable ways upon the nature of the enforcement environment and technology. As such the paper generates practical policy principles.
A Motivating Example
To understand the sort of effect that we are looking to focus on in the paper it is useful to have an example in mind. The story here will not precisely fit the analytic model presented later, but captures the spirit of what we are trying to do. 4 Consider a setting in which there are some fixed number of firms and each makes a binary decision either to emit or not emit a unit of some forbidden pollutant. Emit corresponds with 'violate', not emit with 'comply'. The enforcer costlessly observes the aggregate level of emissions (has some ambient measure of pollution flow, for example) and so knows how many firms have chosen to violate, but not which ones. Finding that out -and recifying it -requires a two stage inspection/enforcement program. First the enforcer visits firms sequentially. Each visit reveals whether or not that firm is compliant. If it is not the enforcer exerts some additional time/money/resource pursuing the matter -collecting evidence, litigating, administering a fine, returning the firm to compliance and so on.
Within this setting consider the implications of the alternative missions:
Example 1 A target-driven mission would tell the enforcer to achieve a specified level of compliance (ensure that no more than k firms are in violation) at least cost. So the enforcer visits firms -putting violators back into compliance -until his compliance target is achieved. A decision by one firm (call it firm 1) to violate increases the chance that a violation by firm 2 will be detected and penalized.
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We say that non-compliance by firm 1 has a positive enforcement spillover on firm 2. Under standard assumptions this increased risk of detection makes noncompliance less attractive to firm 2, the compliance decisions of firms are strategic substitutes.
Example 2 A budget-driven mission would tell the enforcer to minimize noncompliance subject to a budget constraint. So the agent visits firms at random -pursuing those that it finds to be in violation -until its enforcement budget is exhausted. The higher the proportion of inspections that lead to enforcement activity, the lower the probability that any particular firm will be subject to inspection.
A decision by firm 1 to violate therefore decreases the probability that a violation by firm 2 will be detected. We say that non-compliance by firm 1 has a negative enforcement spillover on firm 2. Under standard assumptions this reduced probability of detection makes non-compliance more attractive to firm 2, so that the compliance decisions of firms are strategic complements.
In these examples, a switch in mission alters qualitatively the nature of the strategic interaction amongst the firms, even though the underlying technology of compliance, inspection and enforcement remains unchanged.
In Example 2 each non-compliant firm benefits from safety in numbers. Others' non-compliance means that they can be expected to 'absorb' more enforcement resource, lowering the chance that the enforcer will get around to uncovering its wrongdoing. In Example 1, on the other hand, there is danger in numbers. The mission dictates that only a certain number of violators can be left in violation, so an increase in the number who choose initially to violate reduces the likelihood that any particular one of them will be one of the lucky ones.
6 5 This should be obvious. Suppose the target is to ensure that only k of, say, N firms are left non-compliant. If there are initially v violators then the probability that any given violator will be caught is v−k v , which is increasing in v. 6 AOL-Autos has as its number one tip for avoiding a speeding ticket finding a 'pack' of The existing literature on enforcement has neglected this strategic interaction.
It is universally assumed in the existing literature that the enforcement objective is fixed. It is also very common to assume that the enforcer is interacting with a single firm. Either assumption effectively dismisses the issues that we investigate here. 7 Our model can be seen as fitting into the wider set of models in which behavior is incentivized by rewarding on the basis of relative performance. These include tournaments (Lazear and Rosen (1981)) and contests (Tullock (1978)). A mission implicitly embodies a particular structure of expected pay-offs, sensitive to my performance but also the performance of others, and so puts regulated parties in a pseudo-tournament situation.
Of course, the precise incentives and interaction generated by alternative missions depends on the specifics of the enforcement setting. Section 2 develops a simple model to show how differences in enforcement spillovers under target-driven and budget-driven missions affect the regulatory outcome. We acknowledge that a more general mechanism design formulation could be used to explore the characteristics of an 'optimal' mission, whilst not (for reasons of tractability) going down that route. Section 3 generalizes the argument and derives a criterion to rank alternative missions according to their efficacy in the presence of enforcement spillovers. Section 4 concludes. speeding cars to travel in. "If you're within a pack of cars all going 10 mph over the limit, you've automatically improved your odds of not being the one that gets pulled over for a speeding ticket, even though you're all technically speeding. The cop has to pick one car; if you are in a pack of cars its less likely to be you." (AOL Autos 2007). 7 There are occasional exceptions. That compliance performance of one firm could affect the enforcement intensity brought to bear upon others has been noted by Lear and Maxwell (1997) , but they do not consider the issue of alternative objective functions. In a different setting Erard and Feinstein (1994) characterize the interdependence of income reporting decisions in an income tax compliance-enforcement game. Our model develops these themes further, and emphasizes the fact that the strategic interaction between firms' compliance choices is conditioned by the enforcement mission.
A Model of Enforcement Spillovers
An enforcer is appointed to control the level of some anti-social activity. For concreteness, we regard this activity as illegal emission of some pollutant but the model could relate to almost any anti-social activity. There are N identical firms, each chooses a level of emissions simultaneously. Firm i's choice -its emission in excess of the permissible limit -is given by x i ∈ [0,x]. Here x i is a measure of the firm's non-compliance, with x i = 0 denoting complete compliance, andx specifies some physical limit to the level of non-compliance.
The purpose of enforcement is to influence aggregate pollutant levels. It does this in two ways. The threat of detection influences pollution choices ex ante, whilst pollution levels can be pushed down ex post by the enforced abatement activity that follows prosecution.
Enforcement is costly so there is the usual trade-off between achieved pollution levels and enforcement expenditures. As we see below, the terms of this trade-off are sensitive to the mission pursued by the enforcer. We assume that the assigned mission is common knowledge and that the enforcer pursues it diligently.
Each firm find being clean expensive and faces a cost function c(x i ). This function is continuous and differentiable and has standard features: c 0 (x i ) < 0 and c 00 (x i ) > 0. So other things equal each firm would choose a high value of x i .
However, non-compliance carries the risk of prosecution and penalty. That risk depends upon the enforcement regime and the decisions of other firms.
They are a variety of ways in which we might sensibly model the process of enforcement in a particular setting. This may depend upon a variety of aspects of the nature of emissions, the physical environment, mechanics and technologies of detection, the policy and legal 'architecture', and so on. But we don't want to get bogged down in the particularities here -the set-up in this section is illustrative, the framework in Section 3 is definitive and allows for much more generality.
For current purposes we assume that enforcement has two stages: the first involves inspection in order to detect instances of non-compliance, the second involves pursuing/prosecuting firms found to be non-compliant. Each inspection costs the enforcer φ 0 . The cost of pursuing/prosecuting a firm found non-compliant is φ 1 (x)
where φ 1 (0) = 0 (compliant firms absorb no enforcement effort), φ 0 1 > 0 and φ 00 1 < 0. Without providing a micro-level description of the process of enforcement, we have in mind that the effort required to generate the evidence for and prosecute a large polluter will exceed that required for a small polluter. 8 Nothing substantive, however, rests on this and we can imagine situations where φ 1 would take other forms.
Total enforcement cost for a firm with non-compliance level x i is, then, given by
We are going to focus on the relationship between number of inspections, n, and the average level of non-compliance in the population, x. If n ≤ N firms are inspected randomly the probability that a particular firm will be picked for inspection is simply
and we will refer to r(x) as the enforcement risk faced by that representative firm.
If n(x) is increasing in x -so that an increase in non-compliance by other firms increases the enforcement risk -we say that the enforcement spillover is positive. 9 If n(x) is decreasing in x -so that an increase in non-compliance by other firms decreases the enforcement risk -we say that the enforcement spillover is negative.
A firm found to be in violation has to pay a fine and undertake whatever abatement activity is needed to return to compliance. The costs to the firm associated with these are captured in a single, composite 'penalty' function p(x). 10 We will make the standard assumptions that p(0) = 0 whilst p(x) > 0; p 0 (x) > 0 and
As usual an individual firm's choice involves a trade-off between the costs of compliance c(x i ) and the expected penalty r(x)p(x i ) from non-compliance. But 8 Penalties for large violators are bigger than those facing small (we will introduce a penalty function below) and it may be that the court would set a higher standard on the quality of evidence that it requires, or that the larger violator would engage in more obfuscation than its smaller couterpart. Further, recall that φ 1 incorporates the cost of putting the violator back into compliance and this might reasonably be thought to be increasing in the amount of 'movement' needed. 9 For tractability, we treat n as a continuous variable. This saves mess. 10 This might also capture reputational or so-called 'market losses', or any other costs to a firm being found in violation of the regulation.
importantly a particular firm's point of view the risk of any non-compliance being penalized varies with the choices of other firms. As we focus on symmetric equilibria, we use (x i , x −i ) ∈ R 2 + to denote the configuration where firm i chooses x i and all firms other than i choose the identical value x −i . Let r(x i , x −i ) denote the enforcement risk associated with this configuration. So firm i chooses
taking x −i , the (symmetric) choice of other firms as given. Letting V 1 and V 2 denote the partial derivatives of this function with respect to x i and x −i respectively, an interior minimum must satisfy
This implicitly defines a 'reaction function', R i (x −i ), which tells firm i's optimal response to x −i . 12 At a symmetric Nash equilibrium
The equilibrium will be unique and 'stable' if the absolute value of the slope of the reaction function is less than 1.
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Clearly, there exists a wide range of models of compliance, with ad hoc assumptions about the objective function of the enforcer, that are consistent with the above enforcement setting. What we want to do now is explore the relationship between enforcement mission and outcomes and identify the characteristics of a "good" enforcement mission. 11 The associated second-order condition for a minima is V 11 (x i , x −i ) > 0 and we restrict attention to cases where that is met. 12 Whether firms's choices are strategic substitutes or complements, in the sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) , depends on the sign of the cross-partial V 12 . It is easy to show that choices are strategic substitutes if V 12 > 0, and strategic complements if V 12 < 0. 13 For this we require that |V 12 | < |V 11 | which corresponds to the standard stability assumption routinely made in models of this sort.
Target-driven mission
Suppose, first, that the enforcer is asked to get aggregate emissions down to some level τ > 0. The aggregate level of pollution in any symmetric equilibrium is given by Nx. So if this exceeds τ , the enforcer must prosecute enough firms to reduce the total level of pollution to τ . Since each prosecution brings a firm back into compliance and reduces pollution by an amount x, the required reduction in aggregate pollution, Nx − τ necessitates
inspections (we use the superscript t to denote that the target-setting mission is in play). At any symmetric outcome x i = x −i = x, the probability of inspection for any particular firm is
if Nx ≥ τ , and zero otherwise. Using r t 1 and r t 2 to denote the partial derivatives of this enforcement risk with respect to x i and x −i we have
and r t 2 = (N − 1)r t 1 > 0. The last relation describes the nature of the spillover for this mission. From the perspective of firm i, an increase in non-compliance by other firms increases average non-compliance. This compels the enforcer to increase the number of inspections in order to preserve the target τ . In terms of our earlier terminology, the enforcement spillover is positive. In a two firm setting, for example, an increase in violation by firm A increases the enforcement risk faced by firm B and makes violation less attractive to the latter.
Under conditions that are easy to specify each firm's optimal choice is welldefined. 14 The unique symmetric equilibrium under this mission can be represented 14 For the optimal choice to be a minimum, it is sufficient that the elasticity of the penalty function exceeds as (x t , x t ), where
Budget-driven mission
Consider an alternative mission in which the enforcer is given a fixed budget β > 0 and told to get the level of pollution as low as possible subject to that budget constraint. 16 Once again, consider a symmetric outcome. Given the average level of noncompliance x = x at this outcome, the budget can finance at most
inspections (and resulting pursuits/prosecutions). The implied probability of prosecution at this symmetric outcome is
The partial derivatives of this function are given by
and r
Again this second term is of interest. An increase in non-compliance by other firms increases the average level of non-compliance. Why is this so? Recall that prosecution cost is increasing in x, so the increased expected 15 We have to distinguish between ex ante non-compliance, the level defined by this first-order condition, and the ex post non-compliance that will prevail after the enforcement program has run its course and some subset of violators have been pushed back into compliance by regulatory effort. The ex post rate of compliance here will be τ . 16 To keep things interesting we assume that the budget is binding -in other words that inspecting all firms is not feasible. Analytically β < Nk(0).
burden-per-inspection on the enforcer's limited enforcement budget results in a reduction in the expected number of inspections. With this budget-driven mission, the enforcement spillover is negative. In a two firm setting, for example, an increase in violation by firm A makes violation more attractive to firm B.
Once again, under moderate conditions, each firm's optimal response is given by well-behaved reaction functions.The firm's choices can be described by a rection function (which is well-behaved under moderate conditions -see Appendix) and are strategic complements if the elasticity of the penalty function is sufficiently high.
The symmetric equilibrium under this mission, (
The equilibrium outcome in this case depends on the enforcement budget. It is straight-forward to verify that x b (β) is decreasing in β, so that a higher enforcement budget achieves greater ex ante compliance.
Comparing outcomes
How do the equilibria under these two missions compare in terms of compliance decisions and enforcement expenditure? Note that outcomes x t (τ ) and x b (β) vary with the chosen target τ and budget β respectively, so that any comparison makes sense only for suitably calibrated pairs of values of these parameters.
One possible approach may be to choose values of these parameters so that the two alternative missions are somehow similar in terms of their enforcement pressure. Such calibration is not straightforward because the enforcement pressure functions also varies with firms' choices, which may differ across missions.
Consider an arbitrary budget-driven mission (b, β) and an arbitrary targetdriven one (t, τ ). Suppose under the former mission, the symmetric outcome where such τ * can be found, we have a functional relationship τ * (β), with
The central question is, how does the outcome x t (τ * ) under mission (t, τ * (β)) compare with that under mission (b, β)? We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let x b (β) denote the outcome under budget-driven mission (b, β).
The same outcome can be achieved at lower enforcement cost under an appropriately calibrated target-driven mission (t, τ ).
A formal proof is provided in the Appendix, but a comparison of (8) and (12) is suggestive. The two missions differ in the nature of the enforcement externality.
The target-driven mission generates a positive enforcement spillover which serves to enhance the incentive impact of any particular level of enforcement pressure. A budget-driven mission dilutes incentives, so ends up with higher realized enforcement costs for any particular compliance outcome.
A General Model
While this comparison in the last Section illustrated the significance of enforcement spillovers for outcomes, the analysis was limited by the specificity of the missions and the particularities of the enforcement setting and the missions considered.
Our aim in this Section is to make things much more general, and to establish as a general result what we have just noted by example -namely that a 'good' mission in a particular setting will be one that generates, when interacted with the other elements of that setting, positive enforcement externalities.
As above we consider an enforcer with a mission to control the level of some antisocial activity. There are N identical firms and again each firm's non-compliance choice is denoted by a real-valued variable x i ∈ [0,x]. Aggregate non-compliance is
given by the N-dimensional vector x = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N }. The purpose of enforcement is to influence x.
The enforcer is issued with a mission to pursue. We consider any mission of the form (M, μ), where M describes any broad objective and μ is a real-valued parameter associated with that objective. To relate this to the missions compared in the previous section, M might refer to 'maximize compliance with given enforcement budget', or 'minimize enforcement cost of achieving some target level of compliance', while μ is the assigned target level or allocated budget. Going beyond those missions M might, for example, call for inspecting a fixed fraction μ of the population of firms. It might also be captue some hybrid version of the target-driven/budget-driven cases, with a parameter capturing the 'softness' of the budget constraint.
As before firms face a choice between spending on compliance and the risk of being penalized for non-compliance. The enforcement environment faced by each firm can be described by an enforcement pressure function, which captures the probability that non-compliance will be detected and penalized. This depends on the mission in place (as well as the behavior of other firms). For firm i, write the enforcement pressure function under mission (M, μ) as:
In this formulation, the enforcement pressure on the firm depends on its own choice x i but also on x −i , the vector of choices made by the N − 1 other firms. We make no prior assumption about the effect of changes in x −i , as this can differ across missions. A mission generates negative spillovers if the enforcement pressure on firm i is decreasing in another firm's -call it firm j -level of non-compliance:
The opposite sign describes a positive spillover.
We restrict attention again to symmetric cases, allowing us to drop the firmspecific subscript (so that r
Two, that the effect of individual compliance choices on the enforcement pressure function is symmetric across firms (so that
for all i and j.) The latter assumption is natural in environments where, as in the previous section, individual choices affect enforcement intensity through the average level of non-compliance. Lastly, the enforcement pressure function is assumed to be smooth and differentiable.
First consider an individual firm's choices in such enforcement environments.
The firm aims to maximize expected profits, given by a function of the form
As greater enforcement intensity is associated with higher expected value of financial penalties, we assume this function is decreasing in its second argument, r.
Each firm's profit varies with other firms' choices due to the assumed enforcement spillovers. 17 To study the strategic interaction in firms' compliance choices, we make the standard assumption that firms choose their own compliance choices taking other firms' choices as given and consider symmetric Nash equilibria in the level of noncompliance. Define W (x i , x −i ) as the profit function for the typical firm when it chooses x i and all other firms make a symmetric choice x −i . 18 As defined, W is a function of just two arguments, the firm's own choice x i and the symmetric choice x −i made by other firms. We consider a firm's profit-maximizing choice of x i given any arbitrary x −i , focusing on environments in which the optimal choice is interior.
Let W 1 and W 2 denote the partial derivatives of the profit function with respect to these arguments. An interior solution must satisfy the first-order condition:
If W 11 is negative at this solution, the solution characterizes firm i's best response to x −i . The optimal choice defines a reaction function. As the enforcement spillover is sensitive to the enforcement mission (M, μ), so is the reaction function: we write
The superscript M highlights the feature that equilibrium outcome varies with the enforcement mission.
Given the assumed interiority of the optimal choices at the symmetric equilibrium, we have
17 In order to focus on the regulatory spillover, we abstract from any other linkages between firms. We do not, for example, consider the possibility that firms might interact in an imperfectly competitive product market such that they might have incentive to 'raise rivals costs' (Salop and Scheffman (1983) ). 18 That is, with a slight abuse of notation, we have
Our proposed task of comparing equilibrium outcomes under alternative missions is easiest in environments with unique equilibria. A sufficient condition for uniqueness is that the absolute value of slope of firms' reaction function is less than unity at any symmetric equilibrium. Formally, if we define W 12 to be the second-order cross-partial of the function W -this measures the impact of a symmetric change in output by all other firms -the following assumption is sufficient for uniqueness.
Lastly, within a particular mission, the equilibrium outcome is sensitive to the choice of the parameter μ. Implicit differentiation of set of first-order conditions suggests that x M (μ) is increasing (decreasing) in μ if and only if W 1μ is positive (negative).
Comparing outcomes under alternative missions
We say that two missions are equivalent in terms of their enforcement pressure if 
We aim to compare outcomes under alternative missions that are equivalent in terms of their enforcement pressure but differ in their enforcement spillover. 19 Of course, two arbitrarily chosen missions could differ so much that such equivalence never holds, regardless of the values of α, β and x. We confine attention to mission-pairs that are not inconsistent in this sense. Such a restriction should not trouble the reader. If the equilibrium outcome is sensitive to enforcement spillovers, it should not surprise us that missions that differ in enforcement spillovers generate distinct outcomes even when the enforcement pressure is equivalent. Our aim, then, is to examine if outcomes vary with the nature of the spillover in a systematic fashion.
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider two missions (A, α) and (B, β), with unique symmetric outcomes x A (α) and x B (β). If these missions are equivalent in terms of enforcement pressure at outcome x A , then if
A formal proof of this proposition is in the Appendix.
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The Proposition says that, relatively speaking, if a mission generates strong (positive) enforcement spillover, it serves to enhance the compliance incentives associated with a given level of enforcement pressure. In the comparison described in the previous section target-driven missions, which generate positive spillovers, induced more compliance than budget-driven alternatives with negative spillovers.
Proposition 2 allows for greater generality: it is not restricted to the case where missions under comparison generate spillovers of differing signs. It is the relative 20 Note that the proposition requires us to compare the value of the derivatives only at a specific points (x A , α) and (x A , β) respectively. This provides the weakest necessary condition for the proposition to hold. In the preceding examples one of these derivatives was positive and the other negative, so the required inequality held everywhere.
ordering of enforcement spillovers that is key in determining the relative efficacy of alternative enforcement missions. As long as enforcement spillovers can be ranked, so can the outcome: any given level of spending on enforcement will generate a correspondingly higher level of compliance though missions that have stronger enforcement spillovers.
In general the size and sign of spillovers will depend upon the combination of the fundamental elements of the enforcement setting, and the mission according to which the agency embedded in that setting behaves. This provides for the notion that particular missions may be particularly suited (be 'good') in particular contexts. Further exploration of these context-specificities provides the basis for further work.
Alternatively we can fix performance for the purpose of comparison. Corollary 1 highlights the fact that the expected enforcement cost of achieving a particular compliance outcome is lower for missions that induce positive enforcement spillovers.
Corollary 1 Consider two missions (A, α) and (B, β) that satisfy the inequality in (18) . Then any given outcome x can be achieved at lower enforcement cost under mission A than under mission B.
Proposition 2 and its corollary allow us to assess the efficacy of other missions too. Consider, for instance, a mission that calls for an inspection of an exogenouslyfixed fraction of firms. By design such missions imply no enforcement spillovers.
However, our argument tells us that this will be dominated, in term of efficacy, by missions that create positive enforcement spillovers.
Various elements of the enforcement 'setting', combined with the mission, will serve to determine the size and sign of the spillovers (recall Example 1 and Example 2 set out in the Introduction). Are inspections sequential? What is the order of moves between the agency and firms, and amongst firms? Is it inspection that is costly, or is it the enforcement against a firm shown to be non-compliant absorb extra resource? Is inspecting a non-compliant firm more costly than inspecting a compliant one? Does the agency have access to a measure of aggregate compliance rates in the population (such as an ambient measure of pollution in an environmental setting) before deciding on the intensity with which to progress a firm-by-firm inspection/enforcement programme? But amongst this wide set of ways in which particular enforcement settings might vary the analysis here allows us to understand the principles according to which particular combinations of missions and enforcement settings can be evaluated -the basis on which we can distinguish 'good' ones from less good ones in a particular context.
When characterizing strategic interaction it is natural to think in terms of strategic complementarity or substitutability, so it is natural to ask how they fit in with the analysis and results here. (The terminology of strategic substitutes and complements was introduced by Bulow, Geanokoplos and Klemperer (1985)).
Strictly speaking strategic complementarity and spillover are not the same thing.
Spillovers describe interactions in payoffs, while strategic complementarity refers to interactions in strategies. Mathematically the difference is straightforward:
spillovers refer to the sign of the partial derivative of one firm's objective function with respect to a rival's choice, while strategic complementarity is determined by the sign of the second cross-partial derivative of the objective function. In the particular cases that we have explored -analyzing enforcement/compliance games underpinned by stylized inspection 'technologies' of various different types
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-we have found that negative (positive) spillovers invariably go together with the non-compliance game played between firms being one in strategic complements (substitutes). It is intuitive why this should typically be the case, and whilst we cannot rule out the possibility of the perverse pairing it is straightforward to develop conditions that ensure a correspondence between the two. The Appendix does so for the examples discussed in Section 2.
Conclusions
Outcomes -actual patterns of compliance achieved -depend not just on the level of enforcement expenditure but also on the specific mission given to the enforcer. 21 Not just those reported here, but the numerous others we have experimented with in developing the framework in this paper.
Different missions can generate qualitatively different types of strategic interaction amongst firms. Those that generate positive enforcement spillovers are preferable to those that generate negative -or positive but smaller -spillovers. 22 In plausible settings this suggests a preference for target-driven missions over budget-driven ones.
While we have explored strategic linkages through the mission, other features of enforcement regimes might generate linkages too. Heather Eckert at Alberta University is using GIS methods to investigate spatial correlations in inspection patterns. One stylized story to hold in mind there is that an inspector who has reason to drive to locale X to visit some firm may have a tendency to visit other firms nearby "whilst he is in the neighborhood" (Eckert, personal correspondence).
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The spirit of our enquiry suggests a more fundamental mechanism design problem: the issue of an optimal mission, and indeed whether delegation of enforcement activity is optimal. 24 We do not address this larger problem in this paper, taking 22 The ambiguity of the direction of the spillover -and its sensitivity to the agency's objective function -has been noted in the context of a model of tax reporting and verification by Heyes the enforcement agency has a fixed budget. 24 Though it is reasonable to think that in the sorts of setting we are considering delegation is inevitable -the Prime Minister cannot police every section of highway and every effluent pipe on as given that most enforcement activity is delegated to specialist agencies.
The extent to which better-designed missions can improve the outcome will, of course, depend upon the setting. It is reasonable to conjecture that the benefits will be greatest where the number of regulated parties is comparatively small. Indeed the strategic interaction matters less as the number of firms becomes large (or as each firm becomes 'small' in the formal sense) -the type of mission matters more in oligopolistic than more competitive sectors. This may further the case for compartmentalizing the activities of enforcement to a more local level to allow, with appropriate choice of mission given to local enforcers, firsm to be put 'in competition' with one another.
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Our analysis offers a new rationale for a broad preference for target-driven missions over budget-driven ones in public governance. There are, as ever, caveats.
There are potential weaknesses in target-driven approaches that our framework is insufficiently rich to pick-up. has been particularly keen in the US and EU. 26 A hospital told that it has to reduce the average waiting time in an emergency room between triage and treatment may seek to reduce that time by delaying triage. A university department told that it needs to increase student pass rates may relax examining standards. In each case a wedge is driven between the 'currency' in which the target is set and the dimension that actually matters -overall time to treatment at the hospital, quality of teaching in the university.
A Appendix -probably not for publication
A.1 Details of formal arguments in Section 2
Firm i chooses x i ∈ [0,x] to minimize the continuous function
The solution is interior for a given x −i as long as lim x i →0 V 1 (x i , x −i ) < 0 and
where V 1 is the partial derivative with respect to x i . A sufficient condition for the first inequality is that c
In what follows, we assume this to hold. An interior minimum must satisfy the first-order condition
As c 0 < 0 the first-order condition requires that p 0 r +pr 1 > 0 at the optimum where r 1 is the partial derivative of r with respect to x i . If r 1 > 0 this requirement is straightforward. If r 1 < 0, we require that
or that the elasticity of the penalty function exceed the (absolute value of) elasticity of the enforcement pressure function with respect to a firm's own choice.
A sufficient condition for this critical point to be a minima is that the second derivative V 11 (x i , x −i ) be positive. Formally,
As long as these conditions are satisfied, there exists a well-defined reaction function R i (x −i ) that represents firm i's optimal response to the symmetric choices made by other firms.
The slope of a firm's reaction function (to the symmetric choice of others) is given
As V 11 > 0 at the minima, the reaction function is upward sloping (a case of strategic complementarity) if V 12 < 0, and downward sloping (strategic substitutes)
At a symmetric Nash equilibrium
The equilibrium will be unique and 'stable' if the absolute value of the slope of the reaction function is less than 1. For this we require that |V 12 | < |V 11 |.
A.1.1 Target-driven mission
For this case
Consider any positive target τ < Nx. If aggregate pollution is within the target τ , the probability of inspection is zero, and with c 0 < 0 there is an incentive for every firm to pollute more. In the aggregate, emissions must rise to exceed the target.
Abatement activity on prosecution then restores pollution to the target level. This establishes interiority of the optimum.
The first order condition for the an interior optimum for the level of emissions
For Nx ≥ τ , the partial derivative of the enforcement pressure function is
A sufficient second-order condition for a minimum is that 
this holds, at least in the neighborhood of the symmetric equilibrium, if the elasticity of the penalty function is not smaller than 1 N at that point. We assume this to be the case. With symmetric choices
using the facts that r It is easy to check that the equilibrium level of non-compliance is increasing in τ . A semi-formal proof runs as follows. 27 The shift in a reaction function R i (x −i , τ ) when τ changes is given by
We have V 11 > 0, so that the R t i (τ ) is increasing in τ if and only if V 1τ is negative.
V 1τ is negative if the elasticity of the penalty function exceeds 1 N , which we have assumed above. An increase in τ shifts the reaction function outwards. At any symmetric equilibrium (x t (τ ), x t (τ )), it must be that x t (τ ) is increasing in τ .
A.1.2 Budget-driven mission
. 
